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Abstract—OS-level virtualization techniques virtualize system resources at the system call interface, has the distinct advantage 
of smaller run-time resource requirements as compared to HAL-level virtualization techniques, and thus forms an important 
building block for virtualizing parallel and distributed applications such as a HPC clusters. Because the Windows operating 
system puts certain critical functionalities in privileged user-level system service processes, a complete OS-level virtualization 
solution for the Windows platform requires duplication of such Windows service as Remote Procedure Call Server Service 
(RPCSS). As many implementation details of the Windows system services are proprietary, duplicating Windows system 
services becomes the key technical challenge for virtualizing the Windows platform at the OS level. Moreover, as a core 
component of cloud computing, IIS web server-related services need to be duplicated in containers (i.e., OS-level virtual 
machines), but so far there is no such scheme. In this paper, we thoroughly identify all issues that affect service duplication, and 
then propose the first known methodology to systematically duplicate both system and ordinary Windows services. Our 
experiments show that the methodology can duplicate a set of system and ordinary services on different versions of Windows 
OS. 
Index Terms—OS-level virtualization, resource renaming, service virtualization, Windows service 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
irtual machine (VM) is a software layer for 
constructing multiple execution environments on the 
host machine. The virtualization can take place at 
several different levels of abstractions [23][6], including 
the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), Hardware 
Abstraction Layer (HAL), operating system level and 
application level. ISA-level virtualization emulates the 
entire instruction set architecture of a VM in software. 
HAL-level virtualization exploits the similarity between 
the architectures of the guest and host machine, and 
directly executes certain instructions on the native CPU 
without emulation. OS-level virtualization partitions the 
host OS into containers, by redirecting I/O requests, 
system calls or library function calls. In this paper, we 
refer to OS-level virtual machine as container that is more 
commonly used. Each container provides a complete OS 
environment but is separated from other containers 
running on the same host. Application-level 
virtualization is typically an implementation of a virtual 
environment that interprets binaries. Multiple levels of 
virtualization can differ in isolation strength, resource 
requirement, performance overhead, scalability, and 
flexibility. In general, when the virtualization layer is 
closer to the hardware, the created VMs are better 
isolated from one another and better separated from the 
host machine, but with more resource requirement and 
less flexibility. As the virtualization layer is moved up 
along the machine stack, the performance and scalability 
of created VMs can be improved. 
Operating system level virtualization can not provide 
isolation as strongly as that of ISA and HAL levels, but it 
has some distinct advantages when supporting cloud 
computing, mobile device security protection, HPC 
clusters, server consolidation, software-defined networks, 
and the Grid computing 
[3][4][29][30][5][6][13][23][26][27][19][31][32]. First, each 
container (i.e., OS-level virtual machine) requires only a 
small amount of system resources (e.g., memory, disk 
space) [5][23] and thus can achieve good scalability. This 
is because a container shares most files and kernel 
memory with the host environment. Second, containers 
and the host environment can conveniently synchronize 
state changes with each other [5][6][26]. Valid state 
changes in a container can be committed to the host 
environment [33], while new updates or configuration of 
the host environment can be synchronized immediately 
in a container. Third, tests in publications [27][19][28] 
show that containers are more efficient than hardware-
level virtual machines. Walters et al. [27] systematically 
evaluates various virtualization technologies for high 
performance computing in terms of network utilization, 
SMP performance, file system performance, etc. It shows 
that the OS-level virtualization provides the best overall 
performance. HP laboratories [19] evaluated different 
virtualization technologies for server consolidation and 
obtained the similar results. Due to these advantages, 
variants of such OS-level virtualization system are in 
production use today—e.g., Solaris 10 [14], Virtuozzo [8], 
and Linux-VServer [22]. 
A standardized way of implementing OS-level 
virtualization involves intercepting system calls of the 
hosting OS, and renaming system resources used in 
system calls so that the system resources of each 
container reside in a separate name space. A well-known 
limitation with OS-level virtualization is that all 
containers share the underlying hosting kernel and thus 
its states. On the Windows platform, this problem is 
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exacerbated because Windows uses a set of user-level 
system services, which behave like daemons in a Unix-
style OS, to augment the kernel to provide various 
functions critical to other user-level services and 
application processes. For example, Windows inter-
process communication mechanisms such as COM, 
DCOM, and RPC, are supported by the RPCSS service 
(Remote Procedure Call Server Service). If the RPCSS is 
shared among containers, it is impossible to execute two 
instances of the same application, e.g., MS Office 
Assistant, in two distinct containers. It remains to be an 
important problem to duplicate Windows system services 
such as RPCSS so that the large installed base of 
Windows applications can concurrently run multiple 
instances in different containers without interfering with 
one another. The goal of this research is to solve this 
problem. As sharing services among different containers 
affects the isolation and security of containers, 
duplicating services into different containers can reduce 
the sharing and thus significantly improve container 
isolation and security. 
Conceptually, duplicating Windows system services 
means replicating a distinct instance of each Windows 
system service in every container. However, it is non-
trivial to completely achieve this goal for the following 
reasons. First, some Windows system services, e.g., 
RPCSS, are designed to prevent creating, registering or 
running multiple instances of the same system service 
simultaneously on top of a Windows OS. Second, to 
duplicate Windows services, one needs to intercept and 
modify inter-process communications, inter-service 
cooperation, registry key manipulations, etc. However, 
because the details of these interactions are largely 
proprietary, it is difficult to make necessary modifications 
to them. Third, in some cases, it is not sufficient to just 
correctly handle these interactions. Some Windows 
services hard-code certain system resource names in their 
binaries, and they will not function properly when run 
inside containers which often have their system resources 
transparently renamed. 
Through an extensive effort of investigating the design 
principles of Windows services and with substantial trial-
and-error, we have developed the first methodology for 
duplicating Windows services. To evaluate the 
effectiveness of this methodology, we apply it to several 
critical system services, including RPCSS, on multiple 
versions of Windows OS. All of the critical system 
services are successfully duplicated. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first paper that demonstrates the 
success of running multiple instances of critical Windows 
services such as RPCSS concurrently on top of a 
Windows OS. Moreover, the same methodology allows 
multiple instances of ordinary Windows services such as 
IIS, Apache or Mysql to run simultaneously on a 
Windows machine, which are often the core components 
of cloud computing [24][25].  
Other types of OS, e.g., Linux and Mac, have similar 
requirements and challenges on duplicating critical 
system applications like Windows services. For example, 
they often need inter-process communications across 
container boundaries and involve hard-coded resource 
names. Although our solutions are tested on the 
Windows platform, our methodology is useful when 
addressing the similar issues on other types of OS 
platform. Due to the large efforts required for OS kernel 
level prototyping, in this paper, we only demonstrate our 
solutions on two different Windows platforms. 
The contributions of this paper are three-fold: 
1. We thoroughly identify all issues concerning the 
service duplication. 
2. We propose the first known solution to the problem 
of duplicating Windows services---the key technical 
obstacle to container-based virtualization on Windows. 
3. We design a novel mechanism to automatically 
enable necessary communications across container 
boundaries. Meanwhile, we enforce access control to 
reduce the impact on isolation among containers to the 
least degree. 
2 BACKGROUND 
2.1 Windows Service Architecture 
Like daemons in a UNIX-style OS, Windows services run 
as background processes, rather than being directly 
controlled by an interactive user. However, compared to 
a UNIX daemon, Windows services have more 
complicated software architecture and implementation. 
The architectural overview of Windows services is shown 
in Figure 1. We observe that, there are two classes of 
Windows services: Windows system services and 
Windows Ordinary services. Windows system services, 
such as RPCSS, offer functions essential to many user-
level services and applications across the system. 
Windows ordinary services, such as IIS and Apache, only 
perform specific application tasks while not providing 
functionality to other services. Both types of Windows 
services are not bound with the kernel and thus can be 
duplicated into containers. 
Windows core processes in Figure 1 refer to system 
processes but not a type of Windows services. Windows 
core processes are extensions of the kernel and provide 
basic functionalities for the start-up and running of 
Windows services, and include such processes as Service 
Control Manager (SCM) and Winlogon. Unlike Windows 
services, core processes are bound with the kernel and 
should not be duplicated in containers. Specifically, there 
are two reasons. First, a core process might be responsible 
for preparing an essential running environment of the OS, 
for example, SMSS creates Win32 subsystem. Creating 
multiple instances of SMSS will fail, because Windows 
OS kernel can not support multiple instances of Win32 
subsystems. Second, a core process might fulfill a set of 
OS API functions which extend those of the OS kernel. 
For example, SCM process fulfills service management 
API functions. Duplicating such form of core processes 
would be disabled by the kernel, which was observed 
from our experiments. Consequently, core processes like 
SCM and SMSS can not be duplicated and thus must stay 
in the host environment.  
Windows services are started in a way very different 
from normal user-level processes. All Windows services 
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are managed by a core process called the Service Control 
Manager (SCM), which maintains an internal database 
that records the group of registry keys, the name, the 
image path, and the start-up parameters for each 
Windows service. A set of predefined operations must be 
called in an orderly fashion, as shown in Figure 1, so as to 
create, initiate, and run a Windows service under SCM’s 
supervision. Step 1 is to create a new Windows service by 
calling the API function CreateService(), in which the 
SCM adds the service’s name, image path, and start-up 
parameters into the SCM database. Step 2 is to start a 
service process by invoking the API function 
StartService(), in which the SCM spawns a service process 
according to the service’s information in the SCM 
database. In Step 3, a service process that just gets started 
must immediately tell the SCM what services it offers by 
sending the SCM a service table. In Step 4 the newly 
started service process registers its service name with the 
SCM. If a service name is already registered in the SCM 
or is not in any service table, the SCM denies the service 
name registration request. By denying multiple requests 
to register the same service, the SCM prevents multiple 
instances of the same service from running. In Step 5, the 
service process reports to the SCM when it is ready to 
accept service requests. In Step 6, when a user process 
requests access to a target service, the SCM forwards the 
request to the corresponding service. Finally, during the 
startup time or runtime, a service process may have to 
interact with other services and Windows core processes 
to, for example, login, authenticate itself, or launch its 
COM server. A Windows service process may hang or act 
unexpectedly if any of the above interactions fails in some 
way.  
Communications between Windows services or 
between Windows services and Windows core processes 
are through complex and often undocumented inter-
process communication (IPC) mechanisms. Compared to 
the UNIX-style OS, the Windows OS supports a wider 
variety of IPC mechanisms, including mutex, event, timer, 
semaphore, shared memory, mailslot, pipe, socket, RPC, 
LPC, DDE, COM, Windows message, data copy, and 
clipboard. Without a full understanding of how Windows 
services interact with one another and with Windows 
core processes, it is difficult to duplicate these services by 
properly restricting or transforming these interactions.  
Some Windows services are in the form of a DLL 
(Dynamically Linked Library) and their run-time 
incarnation is different from those Windows services that 
are processes instantiated from an EXE file. DLL-based 
services require additional information stored in the SCM 
database and different startup parameters when 
compared with process-based services. These additional 
complexities further complicate the task of duplicating 
DLL-based Windows services. 
Finally, because most Windows services are close-
source, their internal implementation details are rarely 
documented in any open literature, which include the 
internal logic, inter-process communication, inter-service 
cooperation, related registry entries, etc. Consequently, it 
takes a great deal of effort to investigate and reveal the 
implementation details of Windows services to the extent 
that the resulting knowledge enables us to duplicate these 
services. In this project, we used three techniques to 
understand the design principles of Windows services. 
First, we traced the kernel-level and Windows API-level 
calls that a service process invokes at run time in order to 
determine the set of resources a service process accesses, 
and the inter-process interactions the service process is 
engaged in. Second, we used the tool ProcessExplorer[7] 
to find out the inter-process communication objects the 
service process uses to talk with other Windows services. 
Lastly, we disassembled a service’s binary code to 
uncover any hard-coded service names in a service’s 
binary code and API function calls that use them. 
2.2 FVM 
To implement Windows service duplication, we choose 
FVM (Feather-Weight Virtual Machine) [5], a Windows-
based OS level virtualization technology, as the starting 
point. A major design goal of FVM is to allow efficient 
resource sharing among containers so as to minimize 
container start-up/shut-down cost and scale to a large 
number of concurrent container instances. As a result, 
FVM serves as a great platform for developing failure-
tolerant or intrusion-tolerant applications, for instance, 
“scalable web site testing” [6], which isolates the 
underlying host machine from the potential malignant 
side effects of browser attacks launched from un-trusted 
web sites.  
In FVM, the host is a Windows machine on which 
normal user processes run, and these user processes are 
grouped into containers that are isolated from one 
another. The key idea behind FVM is namespace 
virtualization, which renames system resources through a 
virtualization layer that sits below the OS system call 
interface. The Windows OS uses different name spaces 
for different system resources, such as files, registries, 
kernel objects, network addresses, Windows services, and 
window classes. The FVM layer manipulates the names 
of all these resources when a process makes system calls 
to access them. Through resource renaming, the 
namespaces visible to processes in one container are 
guaranteed to be disjoint from those visible to processes 
in another container. As a result, two containers never 
share any resources and therefore cannot interact with 
each other directly. For example, suppose an application 
in one container (say vm1) tries to access a file /a/b, then 
the FVM layer will redirect it to access /vm1/a/b. When 
a process in another container (say vm2) accesses /a/b, it 
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will try a different file, i.e., /vm2/a/b, which is different 
from the file /a/b in vm1. 
However, to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
common system resources that leads to significant start-
up and/or run-time overhead as exhibited by many 
heavyweight virtual machine technologies, FVM enables 
containers to share most resources with the host by 
default while isolating state changes attributed to each 
individual container through a special copy-on-write 
scheme. That is, a newly created container initially shares 
all the resources in the host. If processes in the container 
make only read accesses to the system resources, they can 
simply access the shared resources in the host, and the 
container does not own any private resources, until 
processes in the container try to modify a shared system 
resource, at which point FVM copies the modified system 
resource and forks it into different versions. Therefore, 
the resource requirement of each container is significantly 
lower under FVM than that with HAL-level virtualization 
technologies such as VMware [5]. 
Despite the fact that FVM supports renaming for most 
name spaces on the Windows platform, the degree of 
isolation among containers that it provides is still not as 
strong as HAL-level virtualization. Previous versions of 
FVM give a few exceptions to the communications 
between Windows system services in the host and 
applications in containers because system services can not 
be duplicated into each container. This might affect the 
isolation capability and system security. To improve the 
isolation and security, in this work, we explore 
techniques to duplicate system services into containers.  
3 WINDOWS SERVICE DUPLICATION 
3.1 Problem Statement 
The ultimate goal of Windows service duplication is to 
replicate a new instance of an arbitrary Windows service 
and assign the instance to every new container that 
spawns the Windows service. To implement Windows 
service duplication on top of FVM, we need to address 
the following four main design issues. 
First, it is impossible to call standard API functions to 
create a DLL-based service, such as the RPCSS service, 
because a DLL-based service usually runs as a thread 
inside a service host process called svchost. Moreover, 
aside from common SCM database information fields 
shared by all Windows services, a DLL-based service 
needs to insert special SCM database entries under the 
registry keys owned by its corresponding svchost process. 
Unfortunately, it is not easy to use API functions to create 
these registry entries at the time of creating a DLL-based 
service. DLL-based services also require special SCM 
database fields to store the binary image path and start-
up parameters of their service host processes. In this 
research, we have developed a methodology that can 
duplicate both EXE-based and DLL-based services in a 
uniform way. 
Second, because the SCM process is a user-level 
Windows core process that has been tightly tied with the 
operating system, it cannot be duplicated and always 
runs in the host. Meanwhile, because all Windows 
services are started by the SCM, it means that all 
Windows services should also run in the host, according 
to the original FVM architecture. To be able to assign a 
Windows service to a container, we need to determine on 
behalf of which container the SCM process starts a new 
Windows service, by observing the interactions between 
containers and the SCM. 
Third, complicated inter-service interactions exist 
between duplicated services and Windows core processes. 
These interactions are typically embodied through 
Windows IPC objects, but their exact implementation 
details are mostly proprietary and thus never 
documented publicly. Moreover, as presented in Section 
2.1, Windows core processes run in the host and cannot 
be replicated in every container, their interactions with 
other processes thus must be explicitly allowed to cross 
container boundaries. Unfortunately, allowing a 
Windows core process to be shared by multiple instances 
of the same Window service that run in different 
containers may cause some unexpected conflicts and 
failures. Therefore, it is necessary to intercept these 
communications and properly transform them whenever 
desirable so that these communications can proceed and 
the original execution semantics for duplicated services 
are preserved.  
Finally, renaming of services is an important technique 
used in service duplication. However, some services 
embed hard-coded service names in their executable 
binary files. More specifically, because the original 
developers did not anticipate that a service program may 
be replicated with multiple service names, they simply 
hard-coded a fixed service name in the program and used 
it as an argument in subsequent calls to Win32 API 
functions. When such service programs run with a 
different service name than the hard-coded one, it would 
behave incorrectly. To solve this problem, one needs to 
first pinpoint the locations of these hard-coded service 
names in the service binaries through an extensive 
reverse-engineering effort, and then transparently modify 
these hard-coded service names.  
UNIX-style operating systems such as Linux and Mac 
have similar issues when duplicating at the system call 
interface applications that resemble a Windows service, 
for example, a daemon. Specifically, among the four 
issues analyzed previously, Linux and Mac have similar 
issues. Corresponding to the second issue, Mac has core 
processes similar to SCM on Windows, e.g., launchd, 
which is responsible for launching daemon processes and 
are tightly tied with the OS. Regarding the third issue, 
some processes, e.g., sshd and getty on Linux and 
launchd on Mac, have to run in the host environment in 
order to provide services to other applications running 
inside containers. Hence, it is necessary to allow such 
interactions while offering strong isolation among 
containers. As for the last issue, Linux and Mac 
applications which have hard-coded application names in 
their executable binaries could break the OS-level 
virtualization logic. For example, Lynx browser and 
osgViewer on Linux, as well as Loom Game Engine on 
Mac have hardcoded application names. 
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Given the issues are similar, we believe the proposed 
methodology to Windows service duplication could be 
useful to OS-level virtualization on Linux and Mac. 
3.2 Service Duplication Methodology  
In this paper, we propose a novel methodology to 
duplicate Windows services that could address all four 
issues above. As depicted in Figure 2, it consists of the 
following four steps: 
(1). Logically duplicating a Windows service by 
creating a separate entry in the SCM database 
with a new service name. 
(2). Physically duplicating a new instance of a service 
by starting a service process and putting it in its 
corresponding container. 
(3). Managing the inter-service interactions between 
duplicated services and Windows core processes. 
(4). Renaming hard-coded service names embedded 
in service binaries. 
In the rest of this section, we describe these four steps 
in greater detail. 
3.3 Logically Duplicating a Windows Service  
In order to duplicate a Windows service in a container, 
we first create a new name for the service in the SCM 
database, which SCM accesses to start a service. As a 
result, SCM treats the duplicated service as a different 
service and does not prevent it from running 
concurrently with the original one.  
There are two ways to duplicate a Windows service. 
One is for EXE-based services by calling an API function 
of service creation with a duplicated service name, like 
“ServiceName-vmX”, where ServiceName is the original 
name of the service to be duplicated and X is the 
container ID of the container initiating the service 
duplication request.  
The other is for DLL-based services. The API function 
of service creation can not create a new instance of a DLL-
based service that is identical to the original instance, 
because it could neither set up a DLL-based service name 
in the SCM database nor add the DLL-based service into 
a service host process that adopts a number of DLL-based 
services as threads. Another method is to modify the 
SCM database directly in order to add a new DLL-based 
service. However, this method could not start the new 
service immediately after the SCM database modification, 
because SCM cannot incorporate the SCM database 
modification without rebooting the whole system.  
Therefore, we choose to combine these two methods to 
create a new DLL-based service as follows: 
(1) Call the service creation API function with a 
duplicated service name, like “ServiceName-vmX”, to 
inform SCM of the creation of a new service. This way we 
can launch the newly created service without rebooting 
the entire system, because SCM can record the 
information of the new service in the memory 
immediately. 
(2) Make a copy of the SCM database entries 
associated with the duplicated service, and modify three 
places in the copied SCM database entries. First, the 
original service name “ServiceName” should be changed 
to the duplicated name “ServiceName-vmX”. Second, the 
names of the services on which the duplicated service 
depends should also be changed from their original 
service names to duplicated service names. Last, the start 
type of the new duplicated service should be set to 
manual start rather than automatic start, because a 
duplicated service should be started after the boot-up of a 
container. With these SCM database entries, a duplicated 
service will behave exactly the same as the original 
service from which it is cloned. 
3.4 Physically Duplicating a Windows Service 
Creating an instance of a Windows system service in a 
container needs to inform the SCM to launch a new 
service process. However, the issue is how to determine 
which container the newly launched service process 
should be placed in. 
At the time when a container creates a service, we 
record a FVM flag and the container’s ID in the SCM 
database entry that contains the service’s binary path and 
start-up parameter. When the SCM launches a service 
process, FVM’s in-kernel monitor moves the service 
process into its corresponding container according to the 
FVM flag and container ID in the process’ pathname and 
parameters.  
For a DLL-based service, SCM starts it as a thread 
inside a service host process. In this case we record a 
FVM flag and a container ID at the end of the service 
process’ parameter list in the SCM database. For example, 
the original service A has a parameter like “-k A”, the 
duplicated service A will have a parameter like “-k A-
vmX”, “X” again represents the ID of the container that 
requests a new instance of service A. When the new 
service A’s process is launched with parameter “-k A-
vmX” and FVM’s in-kernel monitor sees a process with a 
start-up parameter containing “-vmX”, it adds the 
process into the container whose container ID is X. 
For an EXE-based service, SCM starts it as an 
independent process. We first copy the EXE file into the 
container’s workspace and then record its pathname in 
the SCM database. Because the pathname is in a container, 
it will naturally contain a FVM flag and a container ID. 
For example, the pathname of the original service B’s 
image is “c:\B.exe”, and the pathname of its duplicated 
version becomes “c:\fvm\VM -X\C\B.exe”, where ”X” 
represents the ID of the container in which the duplicated 
service is to be placed. When FVM’s in-kernel monitor 
sees a process with such an image pathname, it will put 
the process in the corresponding container. 
3.5 Maintaining Existing Inter-Service Interactions 
As presented in Section 2.1, Windows core processes, e.g., 
SCM, Lsass, and WinLogon, are closely tied to the 
Windows OS and cannot be duplicated. Duplication 
means running a new instance in each container. These 
core processes therefore run in the host. The duplicated 
services inside a container can not see them but can 
interact with them through IPC objects. Under FVM, 
when a process in a container interacts with other 
processes in the same container using IPC, FVM’s in-
kernel monitor intercepts the IPC requests and renames 
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the resources referred to in the parameters of the requests. 
However, for the IPC requests used by a duplicated 
service running in a container to interact with the core 
processes which run in the host, the arguments used in 
the IPC requests should not be transformed. For instance, 
Windows services often connect to the SCM process 
through a named pipe called NtControlPipe. When a 
duplicated service running in a container tries to open the 
named pipe, if the pipe name argument was changed to 
NtControlPipe-vmX, the duplicated service would not be 
able to interact with SCM because SCM runs in the host 
and still uses the original pipe name NtControlPipe. 
 One way to fix this problem is to identify all IPC 
calls used by duplicated Windows services to interact 
with Windows core processes and avoid renaming the 
resource arguments used in these IPC calls [15]. However, 
it is very challenging to identify all such IPC calls, 
because the implementation details of Windows core 
processes are mostly un-documented. To identify long-
term IPC objects and IPC objects used after process start-
up, we dynamically analyze the shared IPC objects 
between Windows core processes and duplicated services 
using the tool ProcessExplorer. To pinpoint short-term 
IPC objects and IPC objects used during the process start-
up, we logged IPC-related system calls and certain Win32 
API function calls during a service’s execution in a 
container and compared the resulting log with that 
associated with the same service’s execution in the host. 
Through this process, all the IPC objects used by 
Windows core processes on Windows XP, HS (i.e. Home 
Server) and 2K have been identified, and they are listed 
in Table 1. When a Windows service running inside a 
container utilizes an IPC object, FVM will not rename the 
IPC object if it is in the list, thus enabling the service to 
seamlessly interact with the Windows core processes. 
However, the above method is non-portable because it 
is platform- dependent. Once moving to a new Windows 
version, we have to look for the IPC objects again. In 
order to address the issue automatically and efficiently, 
we design a table to help find all such IPC objects, say 
Host IPC Objects (HIO), automatically. An HIO can serve 
for the communications between a duplicated service and 
a Windows core process. The table stores all the IPC 
objects of core processes in the host. To reduce the time 
for searching an HIO from the table, the table is designed 
as a hash table. When FVM is booted up, the IPC objects 
are read from core process’ space to the table. Every time 
a Windows service in the container requests an access to 
an HIO, it queries the table using a hash value of the 
requested IPC name. 
Using HIOs to access core processes in the host 
means communication across the container boundary, 
which affects container isolation and security. Hence, we 
further design an Access Control List for each HIO in the 
table. Each list contains the names of the Windows 
services that need to access the HIO, while the ones not 
on the list can not access the HIO. Thus, the impact on 
container isolation and security is reduced to the least 
level. 
To automatically build up the access control lists, we 
further designed a mechanism. That is, every time when a 
duplicated Windows service requests an access to an HIO 
object, we insert its name into the HIO object’s access 
control list. We performed a serial of experiments which 
showed that, after running the system in a secure 
environment for certain time, the HIO table and access 
control lists would not be updated any more. This is 
because that the set of HIO objects and the set of 
Windows services in a given system are limited and 
stable. Actually, there are only 20 HIO objects on 
IPC IPC Objects 
Port \RPC Control\DNSResolver 
\RPC Control\ntsvcs 
Named 
Pipe 
\Device\NamedPipe\net\NtControlPipe* (* represents an arbitrary number)
\Device\NamedPipe\svcctl (only on Windows 2k) 
\Device\NamedPipe\ntsvcs 
\Device\NamedPipe\EVENTLOG 
\Device\NamedPipe\samr 
Mutex
\BaseNamedObjects\DBWinMutex 
\BaseNamedObjects\RasPbFile 
\BaseNamedObjects\SHIMLIB_LOG_MUTEX 
\BaseNamedObjects\ShimCacheMutex 
Section
\BaseNamedObjects\__R_ 0000000000da_SMem__ 
\BaseNamedObjects\DBWIN_BUFFER 
\BaseNamedObjects\ShimSharedMemory 
Event 
\BaseNamedObjects\ScmCreatedEvent 
\BaseNamedObjects\SvcctrlStartEvent_A3752DX 
\BaseNamedObjects\crypt32LogoffEvent 
\BaseNamedObjects\userenv: User Profile setup event 
\BaseNamedObjects\DINPUTWINMM 
\SECURITY\LSA_AUTHENTICATION_INITIALIZED 
TABLE 1  
IPC OBJECTS INVOLVED IN THE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN 
DUPLICATED SERVICES AND WINDOWS CORE PROCESSES 
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76A9752F  push esi 
76A97530  push 00000004h 
76A97532  push SWC76A975C4_RpcSS 
76A97537  push [L76ABE8B4] 
76A9753D call [ADVAPI32.dll!OpenServiceW] 
…… 
76A975C4  SWC76A975C4_RpcSS: 
76A975C4  unicode 'RpcSS',0000h 
…… 
76A97C0C  SWC76A97C0C_RPCSS: 
76A97C0C  Unicode 'RPCSS',0000h 
…… 
76A989FF  mov edi,[ebp+0Ch] 
76A98A02  mov [L76ABE390],esi 
76A98A08  push [edi] 
76A98A0A  mov esi,[ntdll.dll!RtlInitUnicodeString] 
76A98A10  lea eax,[ebp-18h] 
76A98A13  push eax 
76A98A14  mov [ebp-08h],ebx 
76A98A17  call esi 
76A98A19  push SWC76A97C0C_RPCSS 
76A98A1E  lea eax,[ebp-10h] 
76A98A21  push eax 
76A98A22  call esi 
76A98A24  push 00000001h 
76A98A26  lea eax,[ebp-10h] 
76A98A29  push eax 
76A98A2A  lea eax,[ebp-18h] 
76A98A2D  push eax 
76A98A2E  call [ntdll.dll!RtlEqualUnicodeString] 
…… 
76AA8EC4  call [ADVAPI32.dll!OpenSCManagerW] 
76AA8ECA  cmp eax,edi 
76AA8ECC  mov [ebp-04h],eax 
76AA8ECF  jz  L76AA8F16 
76AA8ED1  push ebx 
76AA8ED2  push esi 
76AA8ED3  push 000F01FFh 
76AA8ED8  push SWC76A97C0C_RPCSS 
76AA8EDD  push eax 
76AA8EDE  call [ADVAPI32.dll!OpenServiceW] 
Fig. 4. Disassembled code fragments of rpcss.dll reveal that two 
hard-coded RPCSS service name strings are used as input 
arguments to API functions RtlInitUnicodeString() and 
OpenServiceW().  
Windows XP, HS, and 2K, which are listed in Table 1. 
Thus, we can set up a flag, named HIO Flag, to indicate 
that the table will no longer be updated.  
Figure 3 shows our mechanism using the hash table 
and HIO flag to facilitate interactions between duplicated 
services and Window core processes in the host. The 
bracketed numbers in the figure represent the working 
steps of the mechanism. When the HIO flag is not set, in 
step (1), all names of the IPC objects created by the core 
processes in the host are read and stored into the HIO 
Table; in steps (2) and (5), when a Windows service in a 
container tries to access an HIO, it sends a request to the 
Renaming Decision module which is responsible for 
renaming objects and then waits for the decision result. In 
steps (3) and (4), the Renaming Decision module checks 
whether the object is in the HIO Table. If the object exists, 
it adds the Windows service name into the access control 
list and returns the original HIO name. When the HIO 
flag is set, in steps (3) and (4), we further check whether 
the access control list allows the request but do not 
update the list. 
3.6 Renaming Hard-Coded Service Names 
After the above three steps, FVM can correctly duplicate 
many Windows services. However, some Windows 
services, e.g., RPCSS, still could not be duplicated. By 
disassembling these services’ binary files, we found the 
root cause lies in the fact that some service binaries 
include hard-coded service names. Figure 4 shows the 
disassembly result of several code fragments of the 
binary file rpcss.dll. In these code fragments two hard-
coded RPCSS service name strings are used as input 
arguments to the string processing function 
RtlInitUnicodeString() and to the service management 
function OpenServiceW(). Supposed two instances of the 
RPCSS service are started one after the other in two 
different containers. Both of them call OpenServiceW() to 
register themselves to the SCM process in the host. The 
OpenServiceW() function always uses the hardcoded 
service name “RPCSS” as a parameter to register to SCM. 
Thus, the OpenServiceW() call from the second instance 
will be rejected by SCM because the former instance has 
already registered the service name “RPCSS” into the 
SCM database, and consequently the second instance’s 
start-up fails. 
We analyzed all of the service binaries in both 
Windows 2k and XP. 18.7% of the services have the hard-
coded service name problem. Our algorithm designed to 
identify the problem has four steps: (1) for a given binary, 
querying the corresponding service name from registry; 
(2) disassembling the binary; (3) searching the service 
name in the disassembly code to find hard-coded service 
names; (4) checking call instructions to see whether the 
hard-coded names are used as arguments of a function. 
The results show that most hard-coded service names are 
used by service related API functions. The reason is that 
we are checking hard-coded “service” name. The rest of 
the hard-coded names are used by string manipulation 
functions. This is also understandable because the hard-
coded names are strings.  
Accordingly, we intercept service related and string 
manipulation functions issued by a duplicated service, 
and check if the associated argument is a duplicated 
service name or an unmodified service name. If it is an 
original service name, we change it to the corresponding 
duplicated service name, because functions in duplicated 
service processes should only use duplicated service 
names. With this fix, we were able to resolve the “hard-
coded service name” problem. 
4 EVALUATION 
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed 
Windows service duplication scheme, we developed a 
prototype based on FVM on Windows 2K, XP, and HS. 
To verify the feasibility of our scheme on newer versions 
of Windows OS, we performed a serial of experiments on 
Windows Vista. The results show that all critical points of 
our scheme can be implemented. As Vista and other new 
Windows OS versions all run on NT 6 kernel, that our 
scheme can be easily extended to newer versions of 
Windows OS. 
The Windows service duplication prototype consists of 
two parts. The first part is a new module in FVM’s user-
level management tool. It duplicates a Windows service 
by creating a new entry in the SCM database and starts 
the target service process according to the user’s 
requirement. The second part involves modifications to 
FVM’s virtualization layer in the kernel and systems 
library, puts a new instance of a duplicated service into 
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Fig. 5. Three instances of the IIS web server with the same name 
inetinfo.exe are running on top of a single Windows OS, each of 
which resides in a separate container and is shown to supply a 
page to a web browser. 
Fig. 6. Three instances of the MySQL database server with the
same name mysqld.exe are running on top of a single Windows 
OS, each of which resides in a separate container and is interacting 
with a distinct login client. 
its corresponding container, enables necessary inter-
service interactions and renames hard-coded names in 
the service binaries. With this prototype, we evaluated its 
functional correctness and performance overhead, and 
the results are detailed in the next two subsections.  
4.1 Functionality Evaluation 
To verify the functionality of the prototype, we apply it to 
duplicate several important Windows services including 
the RPCSS and IIS service group, as well as more services 
on different versions of Windows. We present the details 
as follows: 
4.1.1. Duplicating RPCSS And DcomLaunch 
RPCSS is a fundamental service on the Windows 
platform that provides RPC/COM/DCOM functions to 
other Windows services and applications. There are 
about 100 Windows services running on Windows XP 
and nearly half of them depend on RPCSS. Therefore, 
duplication of RPCSS is essential to OS-level 
virtualization on Windows. On Windows XP and 
subsequent versions, the functions of RPCSS are split into 
two services, DcomLaunch and RPCSS. These two 
services co-operate with each other to provide 
RPC/COM/DCOM functions to applications. Using the 
prototype, we duplicated both of them. 
To validate that the duplicated RPCSS and 
DcomLaunch work we performed a serial of experiments 
inside containers: (1) observing whether multiple 
duplicated RPCSS can boot up and create all IPC objects 
correctly; (2) writing a test COM server and running it to 
retrieve Windows version information; (3) starting 
Microsoft Office Assistant and testing its functions; (4) 
opening Excel inside a Word document and testing its 
functions; (5) starting multiple instances of IIS (Internet 
Information Services) web servers and testing the 
functions; (6) launching more services that are presented 
in Section 4.1.3; (7) starting 24 types of more services. All 
these experiments succeeded. As services or applications 
in (2) ~ (7) rely on the functions of RPCSS and 
DcomLaunch, we thus conclude that the duplicated 
RPCSS and DcomLaunch work correctly. 
4.1.2. Duplicating IIS 
IIS (Internet Information Services) service group consists 
of five Internet-based services including W3SVC service 
for WWW, MSFTPSVC service for FTP, SMTPSVC service 
for SMTP, NNTPSVC service for NNTP, as well as 
IISADMIN service for the management of IIS. IIS is the 
world's second most popular web server in terms of the 
number of websites using it. Using the prototype, we 
duplicated all the services in the IIS service group, 
including W3SVC.  
Figure 5 shows a screen shot of running three IIS web 
server instances in parallel on a single Windows machine 
configured with three different IP addresses. On the left is 
the display of ProcessExplorer showing a process list that 
contains three different groups of duplicated IIS service 
processes. On the right are three IEs showing HTML and 
ASP pages returned from these three duplicated IIS web 
servers.  
4.1.3. Duplicating Other Services 
After duplicating RPCSS and Dcomlaunch, we further 
duplicated other services, including MySQL for Mysql 
database, Apache2.2 for Apache web server, Tlntsvr for 
telnet server, CiSvc for indexing files, ImapiService for 
managing CD recording, stisvc for providing image 
acquisition services for scanners and cameras, WebTool 
and WebClient for testing web server performance, 
sdCoreService and sdAuxService for protecting the 
system from malware and spyware, IIS service group, etc.  
Figure 6 shows a screen shot of concurrently running 
three mysql database management server instances on a 
single Windows machine configured with three different 
IP addresses. On the left is the display of ProcessExplorer 
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showing a process list that contains three groups of 
duplicated MySQL service’s processes. On the right are 
three command-line windows displaying successful login 
results. 
4.2 Performance Evaluation 
In this section, we examine the impact of Windows 
service duplication on the start-up latency and run-time 
performance of duplicated Windows services, such as the 
duplicated IIS server and Telnet server. The test-bed used 
in this evaluation consists of two machines. Machine A 
contains a Pentium-4 2.8GHz CPU with 2GB memory 
running Windows 2K, XP, and HS. Machine B contains an 
Intel Core 2 Duo 2GHz CPU with 2GB memory running 
Windows 2K, XP, and HS. We installed the old FVM 
(without service duplication) and the new FVM (with 
service duplication) on both machines.  
As the performance overhead of service duplication 
mainly comes from additional instructions when 
intercepting system calls and API functions, we measured 
the interception overhead accordingly. First, we disabled 
the FVM layer, ran a group of services and applications 
natively in the host environment, and measured the 
average number of CPU cycles taken in each system call  
 and API function through the rdtsc instruction. Then, we 
enabled the FVM layer without service duplication, ran 
the same services and applications in a container and 
took the same measurements. Finally, we enabled the 
FVM layer with service duplication, ran the same services 
and took the same measurements. Each of the reported 
numbers shown in Table 2 and 3 is an average of the 
results of 100 runs. 
Table 2 shows a set of intercepted system calls and 
their average CPU cycles, including four file-related 
system calls and three IPC-related system calls. The FVM 
layer with service duplication consumes 3%~30% more 
CPU cycles than the native configuration for file-related 
system calls, and 91%~113% more CPU cycles for IPC-
related system calls. Although the per-system call 
overhead appears to be significant for IPC-related system 
calls, the end-to-end impact on the overall system 
performance is much smaller, because IPC-related system 
calls account for lower than 0.2% of all invoked system 
calls in our test applications. Moreover, compared with 
the old FVM without service duplication, the current 
service duplication prototype only adds less than 0.3% 
extra CPU cycles. From these results, we can safely 
conclude that the performance cost of service duplication 
is quite acceptable.  
Table 3 shows the average latency penalty in terms of 
CPU cycles for a set of intercepted Win32 API functions 
running on the baseline Windows OS, FVM without 
service duplication and FVM with service duplication. 
The two FVM versions consume almost the same number 
System Calls Native (CPU Cycles) Old FVM (CPU Cycles) New FVM (CPU Cycles) Overhead 
NtCreateFile 318398 382589(20%) 382750(20%) 0.04% 
NtOpenFile 159552 206458(29%) 206625(30%) 0.08% 
NtQueryFullAttributesFile 184507 223240(21%) 223251(21%) 0.01% 
NtSetInformationFile 38827 39992(3%) 39995(3%) 0.01% 
NtOpenSemaphore 29938 63654(113%) 63858(113%) 0.32% 
NtCreatePort 36885 71605(94%) 71774(95%) 0.24% 
NtOpenSection 37766 72045(91%) 72131(91%) 0.12% 
Win32 API Functions Native (CPU Cycles) Old FVM (CPU Cycles) New FVM (CPU Cycles) Overhead 
StartService 2123732083 2123742943(<0.1%) 2123742012(<0.1%) <0.1% 
RegisterServiceCtrlHandlerEx 2808410 2808640(<0.1%) 2808629(<0.1%) <0.1% 
QueryServiceStatusEx 1971947 1971962(<0.1%) 1971961(<0.1%) <0.1% 
SetServiceStatus 2054881 2054903(<0.1%) 2054906(<0.1%) <0.1% 
GetServiceDisplayName 3565502 3565550(<0.1%) 3565529(<0.1%) <0.1% 
CreateService 8100322 8239648(<1.7%) 8100649(<0.1%) -1.7% 
OpenService 5381292 5381417(<0.1%) 5478445(<1.8%) 1.8% 
TABLE 3 
WIN32 API FUNCTION INTERCEPTION OVERHEAD: THE TWO FVM VERSIONS CONSUME ALMOST THE SAME NUMBER OF CPU 
CYCLES AS COMPARED WITH THE BASELINE WINDOWS. “NATIVE” REPRESENTS NATIVE WINDOWS WITHOUT FVM ENFORCED, 
“NEW” AND “OLD” FVM REPRESENT FVM WITH AND WITHOUT SERVICE DUPLICATION RESPECTIVELY. 
TABLE 2 
SYSTEM CALL INTERCEPTION OVERHEAD: THE WINDOWS SERVICE DUPLICATION SCHEME ONLY ADDS FEWER THAN 0.1% 
EXTRA CPU CYCLES. “NATIVE” REPRESENTS NATIVE WINDOWS WITHOUT FVM ENFORCED, “NEW” AND “OLD” FVM 
REPRESENT FVM WITH AND WITHOUT SERVICE DUPLICATION RESPECTIVELY. 
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of CPU cycles as compared with the baseline 
Windows. Moreover, for most functions, the 
FVM version with service duplication is 
actually slightly faster than the FVM version 
without service duplication, because service 
names used in API functions do not need to 
be renamed when service duplication is in 
place. In addition, the higher performance 
differences (i.e., -1.7% and 1.8% respectively) 
associated with functions CreateService() 
and OpenService() are due to the extra 
communications between FVM modules at 
user level and kernel level. 
Figure 7 shows the startup time of nine 
Windows services on machine B, including 
RPCSS, IISADMIN, and W3SVC running on 
Windows 2K, and RPCSS, Dcomlaunch, and 
Tlntsvr running on Windows XP and HS. 
Each of the test services was started in the 
following two ways: (a) starting the test 
service in the host; (b) simultaneously 
starting one, two and three instances of the 
test service respectively on FVM with service 
duplication. The startup time of a service 
corresponds to the elapsed time from the 
moment when the API function 
OpenSCManager() is called to the moment 
when the API function 
QueryServiceStatusEx() returns with the 
result code of SERVICE_RUNNING.  
Figure 7 shows that the startup time of the 
last started instance of each test service on 
FVM when zero, one or two service instances 
are already active is almost identical to that 
of the same test service started in the same 
host. This suggests that the additional 
startup penalty due to FVM’s service 
duplication is negligible, and remains so 
even when multiple service instances are 
started and duplicated simultaneously.  
To assess the end-to-end performance 
impact of the proposed Windows service 
duplication scheme, we measured the 
performance of the IIS web server when 
multiple instances of it are duplicated and 
executed on a Windows 2K machine, and the 
performance of the Apache web server with 
the same set-up on a Windows XP machine 
as well. Figure 8 shows the average 
throughputs of three IIS web server instances 
when they are duplicated and run on new 
FVM (with service duplication). The “Host” 
series shows the throughput of one IIS 
instance that runs in the host environment. 
Figure 9 shows similar results for three 
Apache web server instances. We measured 
the web servers’ performance using 
WebBench [12], a licensed PC Magazine 
benchmark program, and each reported 
measurement is an average of results from 
Fig. 9. Throughput comparison of running a single Apache web server in the host and 
three on the FVM with service duplication (i.e., new FVM). The average throughput of 
the three web servers on the FVM is slightly less than that of in the host. 
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Fig. 8. Throughput comparison of running a single IIS web server in the host and 
three on the FVM with service duplication (i.e., new FVM). The average throughput 
of the three web servers on the FVM is slightly less than that of in the host. 
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three runs. Web servers were deployed on machine A, 
and configured in the same way when it runs on FVM 
and the host. The WebBench controllers and clients were 
deployed on machine B. In every testing session, each 
web server had one to twenty clients concurrently 
sending requests to it, and each client had only one 
outstanding request at a time. The results in Figure 8 and 
9 show that, regardless of whether the underlying web 
server software is IIS or Apache, the average throughput 
of the three web server instances when they run on new 
FVM is about 5% lower than that of running in the host 
(i.e., native). 
Figure 10 shows the performance of eight types of 
telnet commands when three Telnet server instances run 
on FVM and a single instance runs in the host. We used a 
program that can spawn multiple Telnet clients, which 
concurrently submit telnet commands and process 
responses from telnet servers. Each reported performance 
result is the average of the aggregate measurements on 
the three Telnet servers. The average performance of the 
three Telnet servers running on FVM is about 6% slower 
than that of the host. 
In summary, the additional per-system-call or per-
API-function-call overhead due to Windows service 
duplication is small to negligible when compared with 
the baseline Windows OS, and its penalty on the startup 
time and the run-time performance of duplicated services 
is also small (5%~6%). Moreover, compared with the old 
FVM, the new FVM introduce negligible extra reduction 
on the performance of system calls and API functions. 
5 RELATED WORK 
There are two projects more closely related to this work. 
One is Feather-weight Virtual Machine (FVM) [5], which 
enables multiple containers to run on a single Windows 
kernel in an isolated fashion. It is able to duplicate a 
limited number of ordinary services, but it can not 
duplicate system services such as RPCSS and ordinary 
services that require complex inter-service interactions, 
e.g., IIS service group. The other project is Virtuozzo [8] 
that provides isolated environments called Virtual 
Dedicated Server or Virtual Private Server (VPS) on 
Windows platform, but from its public documents, we 
could not find any description about Windows service 
duplication, especially system service duplication. 
The original version of FVM can only duplicate a 
limited number of Windows services by intercepting 
service-related API functions and attaching FVM flags 
and container identification numbers to service names. 
However, as explained in Section 3.1, this method is not 
only limited but also incorrect in some cases because not 
all Windows services can be duplicated. For instance, the 
RPCSS service runs as a thread inside a service host 
process and therefore cannot be duplicated by just calling 
the standard service API function. Furthermore, because 
the original version of FVM did not recognize let alone 
address the “hard-coded service name” problem, it can 
not handle services whose binary contains hard-coded 
service names. 
Other commercial products on Windows also include 
similar OS-level virtualization techniques, including 
Softricity Desktop [9], AppStream [10], PDS [20], and 
Thinstall [11]. In particular, Softricity Desktop [9] 
implements comprehensive virtualization to execute 
duplicated applications without requiring any pre-
installation. Specifically it enables each duplicated 
application to execute against its own set of registries and 
configuration files within a container on any machine to 
which the duplicated application is deployed. However, 
Softricity Desktop can only provide isolated runtime 
environments for applications but not for Windows 
services.  
Recent studies [16][34][35] build library OSes on host 
OSes, on which every application runs within its own 
address space with its own copy of the library OS. The 
library of a Windows service is copied into the address 
space of an application, and thus library OS can run 
multiple instances of a Windows service simultaneously 
inside multiple applications respectively. However, the 
library OS is significantly different from OS-level 
virtualization. A container can support multiple 
applications and the interactions among them, but a copy 
of library OS can only support the host application. More 
importantly, the library OS is difficult to support multi-
process applications which are commonly used and 
require communications through shared states in 
Windows system libraries. 
On Linux OS, there are also several successful OS-level 
virtualization systems, such as Zap [17], Linux-VServer 
[13], and OpenVZ [18]. Zap provides a virtualization 
mechanism to form pods to transparently migrate legacy 
and networked applications across independent 
machines. A pod is a group of processes that are 
provided a consistent, virtualized view of the system. 
Linux-VServer and OpenVZ are container-based systems 
that provide a shared, virtualized OS image consisting of 
a root file system, a set of system libraries and 
executables. Each container can be booted, shut down, 
and rebooted just like a regular operating system. 
However, in this work, we do not try to design just 
another type of OS-level virtualization mechanism. 
Instead, we aim to solve an important problem on 
various OS-level virtualization platforms, that is, 
duplicating services on Windows or daemons on Linux. 
Existing projects did not systematically resolve all of the 
issues related to the service duplication, as analyzed in 
Section 3.1. For example, they are not aware of and thus 
can not address the issues of hard-coded service names 
and DLL-based services.  
If having interest, please also read our other 
papers[36]-[67]. 
6 CONCLUSION 
OS-level virtualization virtualizes system resources at the 
system call interface, and relies on a single kernel to 
isolate multiple containers running in parallel on top of it 
via resource renaming. On the Windows platform, 
additional complications arise because parts of the 
kernel’s functionalities are actually embodied in some 
user-level services, which are tightly integrated with the 
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OS and therefore cannot be easily duplicated or 
virtualized in each container. Lack of effective solutions 
to duplicate these Windows services has been the 
Achilles’ heel for OS-level virtualization to become a 
viable virtualization technology on Windows. 
Unfortunately, none of the publicly available documents 
on OS-level virtualization technologies ever mention the 
service duplication problems, not to mention addressing 
them.  
This paper presents the first known Windows service 
duplication methodology that can duplicate not only 
ordinary Windows services, but also several critical 
Windows system services such as RPCSS. By applying 
this proposed methodology, we have successfully 
duplicated RPCSS, DcomLaunch, and the IIS service 
group including IISADMIN, W3SVC, MSFTPSVC, 
SMTPSVC, and NNTPSVC, as well as MySQL, Apache2.2, 
CiSvc, ImapiService, and Tlntsvr on different Windows 
platforms. As a result, we can run multiple instances of 
the IIS web server, Apache web server or MySQL 
database server simultaneously on a single Windows 
machine, a feat that no previous OS-level virtualization 
systems on the Windows platform, including commercial 
offerings, is able to accomplish.  
Moreover, we also develop a useful technique to 
facilitate the communications between an application in a 
container and a process in the host environment. We 
address the issue by employing a hash table to 
automatically identify the IPC objects that are conducting 
the communications across container boundaries. 
Detailed performance measurements show that the 
additional performance overhead introduced by the 
proposed Windows service duplication scheme is rather 
minor when compared with the overhead introduced by 
the baseline OS-level virtualization logic. Furthermore, 
the startup time and run-time performance of duplicated 
services of FVM with service duplication are slightly 
lower than the same set-ups running in the host. These 
results effectively demonstrate the potential performance 
advantage and thus the overall effectiveness of the 
proposed Windows service duplication technique. 
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